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I.

INTRODUCTION

Recent controversies involving government entitlements, or publicly administered forms of economic advantage, involve three related
issues. The first two have long been the center of judicial and academic
attention: the nature of the property interests protected by the Constitution, and the content of the due process protection to be given
such interests. The third is infrequently recognized: the understanding
of liberty that is implicit in the resulting scheme of interests and
procedural protection. This article attempts to triangulate these issues,
and then explore the legitimacy of limiting, rather than expanding,
constitutional protections for various entitlements.
Although my comments on the due process clause will be general
and fundamental, this article is prompted by a more specific factual
setting. In some instances individuals contractually agree to a more
limited set of procedural protections than they might otherwise be
entitled. These persons apparently exercise their liberty to limit their

*Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. B.A., 1971, Maryland; J.D., 1974,
Yale Law School; Dip]. in Law, 1980, O.fiord University, England.
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property, and consequently also limit the scope of their due process
protection. This set of circumstances does not, however, eliminate
many subjects from the scope of the constitutional debate. For example, situations involving contractual waiver are only a subset of the

larger and more abstract issue of the alienability of rights in general:
When can rights themselves properly be the subject matter of economic
transactions? Other obvious issues include the requisites for a legitimate agreement, the relationship between the concepts of liberty and
property, and the relationship between substantive rights, such as
liberty and property, and procedural rights, such as due process. All
of these in turn raise even more basic questions about the legitimacy
of various methods of constitutional interpretation. Rather than dismiss any of these controversies at the outset, this article will circumscribe their development by structuring them around the troublesome central theme of voluntary waiver of procedural protections.
One reason for the seemingly limitless scope of due process controversies is that decisions by the Supreme Court in this area have
met with considerable and wide-ranging academic criticism., Much of
that derogatory analysis is based on the Court's failure to identify
any consistent, meaningful, or comprehensive theory of the due process
clause as the starting point or organizing principle for its analysis.
These scholarly critiques have also, however, been based on a wide

1. A small sample of that literature would include the following: J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 14-21 (1980); J. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN
THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985) [hereinafter DUE PROCESS]; Grey, ProceduralFairness

and Substantive Rights, in DUE PROCESS, NOMOS XVIII 182 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds.
1977); Lawrence, Fairly Due Process: Minimum Protection Recognized but not Applied in
Matthews v. Eldridge, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 627; Laycock, Due Process and Separation of
Powers: The Effort to Make the Due Process Clause Nonjusticiable, 60 TEX. L. REV. 875
(1982); Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U.L.
REV. 885 (1981) [hereinafter Dignitary Theory]; Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process
Calculusfor Administrative Adjudication in Matthews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search
of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976); Michelman, Formal and Association Aims
in ProceduralDue Process, in DUE PROCESS, NOMOS XVIII 126 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman
eds. 1977); Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property,"62 CORNELL L. REV. 405 (1977); Rabin,
Job Security and Due Process: MonitoringAdministrative Discretion Through a Reasons Requirement, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 60 (1976); Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in ConstitutionalLaw: The Price of Protesting Too Much, 35 STAN. L. REV. 69
(1982); Tushnet, The Newer Property:Suggestions for the Revival of Substantive Due Process,
1975 SuP. CT. REV. 261; Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due
Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445 (1977); Williams, Liberty and
Property: The Problem of Government Benefits, 12 J. LEGAL. STUD. 3 (1983); see also the
articles cited infra notes 2-3.
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range of starting points and basic principles. Thus, not only are constitutional answers in this area in dispute, but even the questions
remain controversial. Any adequate discussion of the due process
clause must as a consequence give attention to both of these general
categories of issues.
The chief task of this article is to update and reassess earlier
criticisms I have made of the Supreme Court's approach to government
entitlements, 2 with particular emphasis on those entitlements involving
a contractual exchange between government and some individual,
rather than simply a handout from government. This effort will not
be limited, however, to my own prior work. Section II develops some
basic, but often overlooked, background issues: the general normative
and conceptual debates at the foundation of much of the entitlement
controversy. Section III provides more background by summarizing
present entitlement case law and assessing a variety of analytical
approaches to these difficult cases suggested by other scholars. An
alternative to these approaches is the subject of sections IV and V of
this article. Section IV summarizes a theory of the due process clause
developed in my earlier articles - the "government-as-monopolist"
theory. That section also addresses the limits this theory suggests for
the constitutional protection of entitlements that are the subjects of
market transactions. Section V critically reexamines and expands this
theory by exploring the nature and importance of contractual liberty
and market-based individual responsibility in the modern regulated
state. In effect, this article confronts the conceptual limits of my
suggested constitutional limits.
II.

PROPERTY AND LIBERTY IN THE STATE OF "BIG LAW"

The modern jurisprudence of the entitlement controversy essentially begins, as many have noted, with Charles Reich's classic article,
The New PropertyA Reich can certainly be credited with creative and

2. See Terrell, Causes of Action as Property: Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. and the
"Government-as Monopolist" Theory of the Due Process Clause, 31 EMORY L.J. 491 (1982)
[hereinafter Causes of Action]; Terrell, Liberty: The Concept and Its Constitutional Context,
1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 545(1985) [hereinafter Liberty]; Terrell, "Property,"
"Due Process," and the Distinction Between Definition and Theory in Legal Analysis, 70 GEO.
L.J. 861 (1982) [hereinafter Property, Due Process].
3. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) [hereinafter New Property];see
also Reich, IndiMual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J.
1245 (1965) (discussing status quo of individual rights after enactment of social welfare legislation).
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significant scholarship for his comparison of government-created
"largesse" - licenses, welfare benefits, employment, and the like to traditional forms of ownership, and his identification of the important constitutional implications of their unusual character. But while
the general reputation of his effort is that of a lively, liberal, reformist
tract, "very bright [and] upbeat, '4 there is a dark, less well-known
side to Reich's analysis that captures the current normative debate
embedded in recent cases and commentaries.
An important motivational tenet in Reich's article was his somber
and depressing view of contemporary life. He perceived our lives to
be controlled by a mammoth conspiracy conjoining big business and
big government: we as individuals are portrayed as helpless victims
buffeted between these two giants. 5 Preyed upon first by capitalists,
we turn to government for help only to find it either colluding with
these financial oppressors or displaying similar arrogance by distributing bits of economic advantage, not as secure rights, but as contingent
and revocable gratuities and privileges. To the rescue Reich sent "big
law." In order to protect the individual, the courts must demand that
substantive constitutional freedoms not be trampled in the dealings
between individuals and government. 6 The various forms of government largesse must not be gained at the expense of basic liberties.
A moral anomaly, however, lurks in this seemingly unobjectionable
conclusion. While Reich may have been concerned about protecting
the individual, he sought to do so from a collectivist perspective. Reich
did not suggest that the remedy for oppression by government should
be less government. That approach would only return the helpless
individual to the jaws of the corporations. Instead, as a true product
of his profession and times, Reich turned to another institution outside
the individual to save the individual. What is disturbing in this
analysis, therefore, is what is obviously missing: some sense of the
individual as a meaningful participant in this drama. Autonomy and
independent personality are not natural and preexisting characteristics
in Reich's normative landscape. Instead, they are features that are
introduced to some extent by intervention of constitutional doctrine.
In this context, in which classical liberal philosophy plays little role,
it is meaningless to talk of an individual voluntarily waiving rights in
exchange for additional economic benefit. The notion of consent is the
smoke screen of the oppressor.

4.
5.
6.

Van Alstyne, supra note 1, at 453.
See New Property, supra note 3, at 772-74.
See id. at 778-85.
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Thus, hand-in-hand with Reich's expansive sense of "new property"
is a more subtle, diminished sense of a "new liberty. ' 7 We are only
as free as "big law" has made us by breaking up or blocking the
repressive efforts of the economically powerful. We wait in anxious
silence, it seems, for news of the next victory in the halls of Congress
or the chambers of the Supreme Court. Liberty, as a consequence,
becomes nothing more than another item of government largesse.
Although Reich delivered this message over a quarter of a century
ago, his ideas continue to find favor in current scholarship. Recent
important examples of neo-Reichian jurisprudence are articles by C.
Edwin Baker s and Margaret Radin, 9 both of whom understand the
concept of property to be only secondarily a device to be manipulated
and shaped by individuals. Primarily, property is for them a device
through which interpersonal relationships are structured by larger
communities in order to protect individuals from such manipulations. 10

7. Liberty, supra note 2, at 591.
8. See Baker, Property and Its Relation to ConstitutionallyProtected Liberty, 134 PENN.
L. REV. 741 (1986).
9. See Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
10. To summarize long, complex scholarly articles in this way is of course to do them a
disservice. The articles by Professors Baker and Radin, supra notes 8-9, contain many interesting
ideas not easily reduced to a single sentence description. Nevertheless, both articles contain
several passages that support my assertion that for both of these authors "property," properly
understood in communitarian rather than individualist terms, is fundamentally and ironically a
device for protecting individuals rather than a device for allocating resources. They are both,
therefore, like Reich, advocates of "big law." They both in turn find intimate and important
relationships between property and liberty, with a substantive, normative form of one controlling
the other. Indeed, both are advocates of heavy regulation of the market, in the name of personal
freedom, of course.
Professor Baker's article is a thoughtful reassessment of the various "functions" that the
social institution of property serves. Those functions are primarily protective in character since
he, like Reich, perceives the individual primarily as a victim rather than a viable agent. For
example, in Professor Baker's world, the fundamental tenet of "voluntariness" is so seriously
questioned that it merges with ordinary conceptions of coercion:
The "voluntariness" premise, however, deserves more direct attention. A voluntary
participant in an exchange does not necessarily voluntarily accept the other person's
ownership of the property exchanged or the propriety of the use of property in
these types of exchanges. A person's voluntary participation means only that, given
that this type of exchange is permitted, given that resources are distributed the
way they are, given that people's preferences have been conditioned as they have,
and given any number of other presuppositions, she views her participation as
preferable to nonparticipation. Given the circumstances, people also generally "voluntarily" hand over their money to a person holding a gun. Granting that voluntariness is a value to be respected, the voluntariness of the exchange does not speak
to the question whether society should change the givens on which the voluntary

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1987
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But Reichian jurisprudence is not the only, or necessarily the controlling, set of normative themes evident in modern entitlement controversies. The notion of individual responsibility has staged something
of a comeback in recent years, modifying the current status of the
"new property" in American legal thought. Now arguments of the
opposite extreme compete for control. Perhaps the property obtained
by the individual recipient of a government entitlement is simply that
which the individual contractually agreed with government to receive

response is based. Respect for voluntariness is fully consistent with regulating or
prohibiting both exchanges and the use of guns.
Baker, supra note 8, at 772-73. Consequently, the distinction between liberty and the lack of
liberty becomes very murky indeed. See id. at 753 n.25, 760-64, 773, 775, 780, 785-90, 796,
807-808, & 810 for other representative passages from Professor Baker's article.
Professor Radin's article is a most useful effort to supply modern substance to the "personality" theory of property associated with the work of Georg Hegel. Professor Radin's focus is
on her concept of "personhood" and the implications it has for the more traditional conceptual
categories of property and liberty. However, her depiction of the proper relationship between
these two concepts is rather different from that offered by Professor Baker. Professor Baker
views property and its functions as subsets within the inquiry into a normative form of liberty;
Professor Radin, on the other hand, takes an opposite perspective, with liberty understood as
a subset of a normative form of property:
Once we admit that a person can be bound up with an external 'thing" in some
constitutive sense, we can argue that by virtue of this connection the person should
be accorded broad liberty with respect to control over that 'thing." But here liberty
follows from property for personhood; personhood is the basic concept, not liberty.
Radin, supra note 9, at 960. Despite this difference, the conclusions the two reach are very
similar.
According to Professor Radin, property can be divided into two major categories (or more
accurately, two parts of a continuum): "personal," or that which is most related to our sense
of personhood, and "fungible," or interchangeable items not intimately connected with our understandings of ourselves. See id. at 986. The former is entitled to more protection than the latter;
indeed, a certain absence of the former can justify fundamental realignment of the latter.
[A] welfare rights theory incorporating property for personhood would suggest not
only that government distribute largess in order to make it possible for people to
buy property in which to constitute themselves but would further suggest that
government should rearrange property rights so that fungible property of some
people does not overwhelm the opportunities of the rest to constitute themselves
in property. That is, a welfare rights theory incorporating the right to personal
property would tell the government to cease allowing one person to impinge on
the personhood of another by means of her control over tangible resources, rather
than simply tell the government to dole out resources.
Id. at 990.
Professor Radin does, however, differentiate her analysis from that of Charles Reich. See
id. at 989 n.111 & 990 n.116. Yet another way one might perceive the debate between neo-Reichians and others is discussed infra at note 106.
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- nothing less, but certainly with no added constitutional gratuities."
In turn, this means that one does have the liberty to trade away
certain lights in exchange for additional financial advantages. Liberty
and property therefore become fundamental individual interests that
somehow exist prior to the creation of government. 12 From this perspective, liberty is not a form of government largesse that is officially
distributed; rather, liberty is another personal asset that can be transformed into such largesse through trades with the government.
The actual present law of government entitlements is a confused
mixture of these two perspectives. Part of that confusion stems from
the fact that the basic issue perceived by the courts and commentators
3
to be at stake is the distinction between substance and procedure,
not property and liberty. The substance versus procedure dichotomy
has the advantages of a more familiar conceptual structure and of
yielding comfortable answers to potentially sticky questions. For
example, everyone now seems to agree, contrary to when Reich wrote
his article, that government cannot, with very minor exceptions, impose limitations on entitlements requiring specific waiver of substantive constitutional rights, such as freedom of speech and religion. 14 In
addition, few today seriously argue that the Constitution requires
government to make particular kinds of entitlements or programs
available.'5 For instance, few would contend that Medicaid or professional chiropractic licenses are somehow substantive constitutional
rights.
Instead, the most persistently troubling issue that has emerged is
narrower, one to which Reich did not pay a great deal of attention in
his original article: 16 whether and to what extent procedural protections
attaching to government entitlements are as constitutionally sacrosanct as substantive rights. Rephrased with reference to the princi-

11.

See, e.g., Property, Due Process, supra note 2, at 901-11; Van Alstyne, supra note 1,

at 463-64.
12. See Liberty, supra note 2, at 574-78; Property,Due Process,supranote 2, at 896 n.201.
13. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985); Laycock,
supra note 1, at 879-80.
14. See Property, Due Process, supra note 2, at 879-81.
15. Some scholars do in fact argue that the Constitution contains a right to welfare assistance. See, e.g., Mlichelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term - Forward:On Protecting the Poor
Through the FourteenthAmendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969); M\ichelman, Welfare Rights
In a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 659, 659-60.
16. Professor William Van Alstyne noted, for example, that "Reich devoted but two pages
of his seminal article to tentative suggestions regarding the procedural due process implications
of the new property." Van Alstyne, supra note 1, at 455.
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ple of individual responsibility, the issue is whether an individual may
waive certain procedural protections, such as a pretermination hearing,
when accepting government largesse, even though the individual would
not be permitted by constitutional doctrine to waive substantive rights,
such as freedom of speech.
This potential distinction between substantive and procedural
rights has turned out to be an issue of considerable difficulty and
controversy because in the particular context of government entitlements, both sorts of rights might be, and are regularly, turned into
financial gain. Thus, the distinction between substance and procedure
is illusory. 17 To resolve these matters satisfactorily requires a comprehensive conceptual reappraisal that overcomes, rather than succumbs to, this troublesome categorization. Examination of the relationship between property and liberty is precisely that opportunity, just
as Reich and others have suggested.
The task then becomes, however, to determine whether that relationship is best understood either in Reich's terms of extreme collectivism or in the competing version of extreme individualism. This
article ultimately argues, as one might anticipate, for a compromise.
However, approaching the issue from a more individualistic perspective is beneficial, both descriptively and normatively, in assessing the
current status of government entitlements under the due process
clause.
III.

DUE PROCESS AND EXCHANGE ENTITLEMENTS:
LANGUAGE, CASES, THEORIES

A general picture of the abstract, normative debate involving government entitlements is not, however, a sufficient basis for the development of this compromise theory of due process protection. The
context within which entitlements must be considered is a complex
matrix of constitutional language, cases interpreting that language,
and numerous scholarly assessments of both the language and the
interpretations. While all of this material deserves serious attention,
the issues addressed have become rather well worn. Therefore, this
article only summarizes the salient points from this background that
seem most relevant to the specific topic of the limits of procedural
protection for exchange entitlements.

17.

See infra text accompanying note 105.
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A. Roth, Arnett, Bishop and Logan
If Reich's article is the fulcrum on which a conceptual transformation in due process analysis turned, then the Supreme Court's decision
in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Rothl8 is the corresponding
event through which the language of the due process clause itself has
been transformed. Prior to this decision one could reasonably argue
that the due process clause was to be read as a unitary whole; people
were entitled to procedural fairness concerning the loss of anything
important to them.19 Roth turned this approach on its head, or at least
its ear, with three interpretive propositions. First, the Court seemed
to endorse the traditional dichotomy of substance and procedure by
stressing the distinction between the two major parts of the due process clause: the initial substantive requirement for an interest in "life,
liberty, or property," and the subsequent procedural guarantee of
"due process of law" should a person be deprived of such an interest.2°
Second, more important, and quite non-traditionally, the Court
determined that the elements within the substantive portion of the
due process clause were individually distinct and meaningfifl.21 That
is, the phrase 'qife, liberty, or property" did not connote a unitary
concept, but rather three separate concepts. Thus, a person's interests
must first find a home in one of these categories before the issue of
due process even becomes relevant.
Third, and most controversially, the decision established a new
analytic approach to the specific concept of property that seemed inconsistent with the substance/procedure separation. According to the
Court, property as a general proposition included interests upon which
one relied and from which one could expect financial benefit. How-

18.

408 U.S. 564 (1972). Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh hired David Roth for a fixed

term of one academic year. Id. at 566. At the end of the fixed term, the university advised
Roth that he would not be rehired for the next academic year. Id. Because Roth was not
tenured, state law left the rehiring decision to the "unfettered discretion" of university officials.
Id. at 567. Under Board of Regents rules, the university officials did not have to give Roth
the reasons for their decision not to rehire him, or to provide him with the opportunity for an
appeal or a review of the decision. Id. Thus, Roth received only a timely notice informing him

that he would not be rehired, without specifying the reasons. Roth then filed suit in federal
court alleging that the decision violated his fourteenth amendment due process right because
it gave no reasons and provided no opportunity for a hearing. Id. at 569. Roth also alleged that

the decision was motivated by a number of unpopular statements he had made and therefore
violated
19.
20.
21.
22.

his first amendment rights. Id. at 568.
See J. ELY, supra note 1, at 19.
408 U.S. at 572.
Id. at 575.
Id. at 577.
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ever, the property protected by the due process clause was confined
to those interests based on "legitimate" reliance and expectation. That
legitimacy was in turn to be established objectively by reference to
the agreement one had reached with the government, an agreement
based on a specific contract and state law.2 A government job would
be property, the Court concluded, if the government had to show
cause for termination of the employee.2 Thus, Roth established that
one could agree in advance to take from the government an interest
of such limited substance - a job with no "for cause" requirement that it did not rise to the level of property given procedural protection.
The constitutional paradox that some find in this conclusion is that
a constitutional requirement - due process - was made dependent
3 Thus,
on a non-constitutional, state law-based entity - property2local manipulation of property law could effectively eliminate constitutional due process. In fact, two cases followed shortly after Roth that
suggested the Court was moving toward this conclusion.
In Arnett v. Kennedy26 the most direct and dramatic test of this
approach caused a deep division within the Court. The case involved
a government job that even under the more stringent requirements
of Roth did indeed rise to the level of property.2 Yet the holder of
the job had specifically waived, in his employment contract, any right
to a pretermination hearing. Thus, the issue was simply whether the
substantive property inquiry would permit reference to all contractual
provisions constituting that job, including any involving procedural
matters.
Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion for the Court responded affirmatively. He depicted the convergence in this contract of substance
and procedure as "taking the bitter with the sweet." That is, one
must take the job as one finds it, procedural limitations and all. Although a majority of the Court did not adopt this approach, neither
did a majority clearly reject it. Two other Justices agreed with the
majority result, but not its reasoning. Because the job in this case
did have the "for cause" termination feature that had been missing in
Roth, these Justices concluded that the job was property for purposes

23.

Id.

24.

Id. at 578.

25.
26.
27.

See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 1, at 440.
416 U.S. 134 (1974).
Id. at 140.

28.

Id.

29.

Id. at 154.
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of the due process clause.O3 The petitioner, however, had already been
afforded sufficient procedural protection.31
In the second case, Bishop v. Wood, 32 a majority of the Court
reaffirmed two of the basic propositions from Roth. First, the substantive "life, liberty, or property" phrase was a prerequisite for the
procedural protection guaranteed by the due process clause. Second,
the telm "property" did not include everything; some government jobs
did not rise to this level because of the absence of the "for cause"
feature. 33 Because the job in Bishop lacked this feature, the additional
fact that the petitioner had waived certain procedural rights in his
employment contract was irrelevant 4 The direct and difficult issue
raised by Arnett was therefore avoided.
Another gloss was then added to the entitlement area by Logan
v. Zimmerman Brish Co.3 Although this case is often thought to
represent a retreat from Roth reasoning, it is factually quite distinct
from that line. Each of the cases discussed above involved employment
situations, and thus more generally a form of exchange entitlement.
Logan, in contrast, concerned a handout: a state program to help
handicapped persons find and retain private employment26 Yet Logan
might be read as rejecting the basic proposition from Roth that procedural questions were linked with and subordinate to prior substantive issues concerning the interest involved. The state's program for
assistance to handicapped persons included an internal procedural requirement - a time limit during which the state agency had to respond
to complaints against employers37 - that seemed to create a limited
form of right granted to the handicapped. But the petitioner nevertheless complained about precisely that which the state had not granted
him. The petitioner argued that the state's failure to meet its own
deadline denied him due process 3
The Court agreed, and in doing so did not stop, as it might have,
at the substance level. Instead, the Court went on to hold that this
limited self-description by the state of the claimant's new rights did

30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 166 (Blackmun & Powell, J.J., concurring).
Id. at 164-71 (Blackmun & Powell, J.J., concurring).
426 U.S. 341 (1976).
Id. at 343-49.

34. Id. at 345 n.8.
35. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
36. Id. at 424-25.
37. Id. at 426.
38. Id. at 427-28.
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not insulate the state's program from due process scrutiny. 39 Thus,
procedural protection might not be quite so secondary and dependent
a constitutional entity as Roth suggested. Moreover, the decision can
reasonably be interpreted to have held that any procedural limitation
associated with an entitlement must be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. 40 In Logan no such purpose for the deadline could
be found. Therefore, being essentially arbitrary, it was unconstitutional.
I believe, however, that any inconsistency one might detect between Logan and the Roth line is superficial. The distinction between
exchange and handout, although usually overlooked, is a crucial one.
On that foundation I will argue in sections IV and V that each of
the four cases discussed above, including most particularly Justice
Rehnquist's plurality opinion in Arnett, is individually correct and
consistent with the others.4 1 The Logan notion of "rational relationship"
will turn out to be a principle common to all entitlement cases, but
42
with different meanings in different factual settings.
B.

Academic Responses

These four cases, along with a few others involving property and
liberty interests implicated by the due process clause /4 have provoked
a great deal of academic comment, the vast majority of it very critical.
I have discussed some of that literature elsewhere.4 This article will
recognize a few more important articles without suggesting that these
contain the only significant observations on entitlement issues.
Before focusing on particular efforts, however, I must note a subtle
but fundamental issue implicated by all this literature. An uncomfortable lesson of Roth and its progeny is that the actual words used in
the Constitution carry enormous weight. Yet in most constitutional
contexts the words of the document have not been a serious barrier
to implementation of important policies. Constitutional language has
been considered so inherently vague that the legitimacy of linguistic
manipulation for the purpose of achieving particular policy results has

39. Id. at 432-38.
40. This is essentially Professor Smolla's analysis of the true significance of the case, which
I adopt for present purposes. See Smolla, supra note 1, at 107-11.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 95-126.
42. See infra text accompanying note 126.
43. See Property, Due Process, supra note 2, at 912-35 (discussing relevant decisions in
this area).
44. See Causes of Action, supra note 2, at 522 n.121; Liberty, supra note 2, at 578-86;
Property, Due Process, supra note 2, at 896-901.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol39/iss2/8

12

Terrell: Liberty and Responsibility in the Land of "New Property": Explori
LIBERTY AND RESPONSIBILITY

363

rarely been seriously questioned or challenged. 45 The entitlement cases
represent an unusual form of this practice, however, in that the substance/procedure structure of the due process clause, and the separate
elements of the "life, liberty, or property" phrase, have been treated
seriously by the Court in order to narrow, rather than expand, the
scope of a constitutional provision.46 These cases therefore raise a very
basic question concerning legitimate constitutional interpretation: Do
important constitutional values exist independent of the language actually used in that document? Correspondingly, then, should the implementation of such values be constrained by inconvenient constitutional terminology?
Some have criticized the Court's unusual emphasis on the actual
words of the due process clause as a futile attempt to engage in
objective or value-neutral constitutional analysis. 47 This apparently
misguided belief in linguistic formalism - that words such as liberty
and property have a restricted, established meaning independent of
and prior to their appearance in the Constitution - has been labelled
a "positivist trap, '4 and "clause-bound" interpretivism. 49 1believe quite
the contrary. Such criticism, while not wholly off the mark, is
nevertheless fundamentally misguided. I suppose it is conceivable that
some members of the Court think they are engaging in a value-free
interpretive exercise, but I seriously doubt it. Instead, the proper
criticism of the entitlement decisions is rather different: the Court can
certainly be accused of making its normative message unclear. However, the act of taking words seriously in the process of delineating
and communicating fundamental values cannot itself be disparaged.
Words are not ends in themselves, of course, but values cannot be
completely divorced from the terms in which they are expressed, just
as the meanings of words are vulnerable to changes in values.5°

45. Indeed, modern "deconstructionists" believe themselves to be engaged in the process
of stripping away the layers of manipulative baggage (and, from the point of view of "critical"
legal scholars, illegitimate baggage) that has been attached to important terms over the years.
A recent useful summary of the divisions this sort of interpretative activity has created among
constitutional scholars is provided in Saphire, ConstitutionalTheory in Perspective:A Response
to ProfessorVan Alstyne, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 1435 (1984).
46. See, e.g., Property, Due Process, supra note 2, at 884; Smolla, supra note 1, at 77.
47. See, e.g., Smolla, supra note 1, at 88-94.
48. Dignitary Theory, supra note 1, at 891-93.
49. J. ELY, supra note 1, at 12.
50. See Terrell, Conceptual Analysis and the Virtues and Vices of Professor Westen's
Linguistics, 1986 DUKE L.J. 660, 669-73 [hereinafter Conceptual Analysis]; Property, Due
Process, supra note 2, at 876.
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Thus, while I believe that the Constitution expresses certain fundamental normative political principles, and that constitutional analysis
must ultimately make reference to them, I also take the language of
the Constitution seriously. The Court's emphasis on the property category, for example, is not at all an inappropriate analytic strategy,
for important normative propositions are contained within this and
any other fundamental legal concept. 51 The problem is that the Court
has not sufficiently carried through with its linguistic focus, thus creating the impression that it is attempting to hide behind the language
of the due process clause in order to reach policy results it either
cannot or refuses to identify.
So the debate over fundamental constitutional values, particularly
regarding entitlements and the due process clause, appears primarily
in the academic literature. But while all commentators seem to agree
that the due process clause, like any other important segment of the
Constitution, embodies certain "core values, 5 2 the methods by which
these values find vindication differ according to the scholar's understanding of the proper relationship between linguistics and such basic
principles. This makes for a complex set of views that have sorely
tested the traditional distinction between substance and procedure.
Some, like Professors William Van Alstyne3 and Jerry Mashaw,11have straightforwardly emphasized values over linguistics, and have
thereby transformed procedural due process into a form of substantive
due process. Van Alstyne, after struggling with a number of possible,
but unsatisfactory, traditional options for coping with the Roth-ArnettBishop assault on procedural protections for entitlements, concluded
that we must recognize a new substantive element of our liberty:
"freedom from arbitrary adjudicative procedure," s or stated more
operatively, "government may not adjudicate the claims of individuals
by unreliable means. 5 6 The problem with this approach, however, is
the way it circumvents the basic issue raised specifically by exchange
entitlements. What are the claims that individuals may raise when
they have waived the very procedural protections they now invoke?

51. See Conceptual Analysis, supra note 50, at 667-73.
52. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 1, at 876.

53. See Van Alstyne, supra note 1.
54. See DUE PROCESS, supra note 1. For a recent review of Professor Mashaw's effort,
see Cass, Book Review, 3 CONST. Com. 525 (1986).
55. Van Alstyne, supra note 1, at 487.
56. Id.
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Van Alstyne responds to this point in effect by making "unreliable
means" an independent cause of action. As a substantive constitutional
right like freedom of speech, it is always available because it simply
cannot be waived. This article will challenge this idea of the supposed
inalienability of substantive rights later. For now it is sufficient to
note that none of the cases discussed earlier had anything to do with,
unreliability in the abstract. Rather, they concerned the loss of a
property interest with unseemly and one-sided rapidity. The claimant
had waived only a right to a pretermination hearing, not his right to
litigate the matter in general. Thus, reliability had not been sacrificed
so much as some undefined sense of fairness or non-arbitrariness.
Mashaw focuses on this point by arguing similarly that due process
is a substantive end in itself. More fundamentally, Mashaw asserts
that due process is a basic principle of individual dignity, founded on
the Kantian injunction against using people as means toward some
end, 7 such as efficient government operation. The problem here, however, in the context of exchange entitlements, is the same as that
discussed earlier regarding Charles Reich's narrowed sense of liberty.
The concept of individual dignity never seems to include individual
responsibility for one's unforced choices.5s Surely a complete account
of this normative proposition will demand an accounting of this element
of autonomy as well.
Other scholars offer both more complex and more simplistic variations on these themes. Professor Rodney Smolla, 59 for example, also
finds no appeal in linguistic exercises, and identifies several deep values implicated by the due process clause. These include "dignitary
process values," "curbing majoritarian excesses, 61 and, regarding
specifically the context of exchange entitlements, the "principle that
the judiciary [rather than a mere contract] is the ultimate arbiter of
due process norms. . .. "2 But Smolla adds another important element
to the analysis that puts a new wrinkle on the relationship between
dignity and contracts. The key to the entitlement area, he argues, is
the "rational basis" test of Logan.6

57. DuE PROCESS, swpra note 1, at 189-99.
58. Indeed, as I noted earlier, Professor Baker has so questioned the idea of "unforced"
choices as to suggest that individual responsibility may not be a viable concept at all. See supra
note 10.
59. See Smolla, supra note 1.
60. Id. at 91.
61. Id. at 95.
62. Id. at 94.
63. Id. at 107-11.
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Under this perspective, individual autonomy can play a much more
significant role. Smolla notes that if a rational basis for procedural
limitations is all that is required for their constitutional legitimacy,
then such a foundation can be provided by a market.64 For example,
where government and an individual engage in a quid pro quo, as in
employment, the market context gives the individual a certain leverage. Thus, waiver of procedural protections appears truly voluntary,
and hence by necessary implication, rationally related to the deal
sought by both parties. Conversely, lack of a market eliminates any
basis for voluntary exchange and denies legitimacy to any waiver of
procedural protections.
Professor Steven Williams6 reached a similar, although much more
detailed, set of conclusions, but under a very different analysis. Williams focused on the linguistic background and structure of the due
process clause and only implicitly developed its normative content.
Like Smolla, Williams found voluntary waiver of procedural protections to be potentially legitimate, but he went much further. He
criticized the entitlement case law as based on confused and inadequate
theories, and suggested as an alternative that the "life, liberty, or
property" phrase be treated seriously. This could be done in either
of two ways. First, the Court could recognize that the elements within
that phrase had determinate and quite narrow meanings when they
were originally included in the Constitution.6 Liberty meant only a
negative freedom from governmental restraints, and property only
the conventional sense of physical ownership. By enforcing these meanings, governments would be much less constrained in their ability to
attach limitations, procedural and otherwise, to entitlements. The issue
left open here, however, is the normative justification for such an
approach.
This gap is filled in large measure by Williams' discussion of his
second alternative. Because this rigid linguistic technique does not

64. Id. at 114-20.
65. See Williams, supra note 1. A recent criticism of Williams' analysis appears in Simon,
Economic Analysis of Liberty and Property: A Critique, 57 COLO. L. REv. 747 (1986).
66. See Williams, supra note 1, at 4-19.
67. See id. at 20-21. Or, more accurately, as Williams points out, one could conclude that
such narrow meanings developed and became solidified over a substantial period of time, and
that we should now return to those traditional meanings. See also Williams, "Liberty" in the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments: The Framers'Intentions, 53 U.
CoLo. L. REV. 117 (1981) (reviewing the history of the fifth and fourteenth amendments as
bearing on the meaning of "liberty" in their due process clauses).
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appear promising, he suggested an economic analysis of entitlement
situations that would yield similar results. Again, the existence of
autonomy provided by a market is the key underlying idea. Williams
contended that an expansive modern interpretation of the words of
the due process clause is only justified in certain narrow contexts:
when government has disrupted or distorted normal markets, either
by foreclosing substantially the creation of private substitutes that
could compete with the government, or by forcing those who use a
private alternative in effect to pay twice for the same good.6 Under
this approach, judicial analysis would avoid unanchored propositions
like dignity and focus instead on more specific and identifiable factual
situations.
Professor Douglas Laycock,6 9 on the other hand, does not find
sophisticated normative or linguistic analysis necessary for a criticism
of the Court's approach to entitlements. The crucial point, he contends,
is simply that the Court's understanding of property as including procedural limitations merges two concepts clearly separated by the due
process clause - the substantive element of 'ife, liberty, or property,"
and the procedural element of due process. 70 Laycock does agree with
others, however, that due process is a separate value itself; it reflects
our desire to be free of being "victimized. '71 More specifically, the
core values72 Laycock associates with the due process clause are "accurate decision making" and a "full hearing on all sides."74
The attractive simplicity of this approach devolves, however, into
superficiality. Accuracy and full hearings are not themselves values;
rather, they represent the vindication of something deeper. That might
be the notion of avoiding victimization, but this potential value can
be understood either factually or normatively. 75 If a sense of being
victimized is a psychological fact, then it might not be present at all
where a person voluntarily waives procedural protections as part of
a market exchange. If, on the other hand, victimization is actually a
measure of some idealized anguish based on an external normative

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
spect a

Williams, supra note 1, at 21-22.
See Laycock, supra note 1.
Id. at 879.
Id. at 885.
See id. at 896.
Id.
Id.
A useful discussion and application of this distinction can be found in Massey, Is Self-ReMoral or a Psychological Concept?, 93 ETHICS 246 (1983).
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standard, then Laycock has inadequately identified and defined this
deep value. Indeed, this value might even be consistent with a rigorous
linguistic approach to the due process clause.
C.

Loudermill and the Burial of Arnett

Recently, and subsequent to this flurry of academic activity, the
Supreme Court added yet another chapter to the entitlement saga.
In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 6 the Court put the
final nail in the Arnett plurality coffin. To remove any doubts about
its approach to the structure of the due process clause, the majority
reiterated its disapproval of the linguistic technique of subsuming an
analysis of procedural limitations within an analysis of the property
interest involved. 7 On the other hand, the decision does not amount
to a full endorsement of the structural, non-linguistic approach to the
due process clause advocated by Laycock.
Loudermill involved employment termination of a security guard
and a bus mechanic, both of whom worked for a school board in a
large metropolitan area. 78 Both were released without a prior hearing. 7The contracts of both employees, however, included a waiver of any
such hearing. 80 The Court could have decided this case by rejecting
the entire Roth "property" line of decisions, establishing instead the
simpler proposition that any employment relationship would be a sufficient interest to implicate due process scrutiny. The Court did not
take this approach. Instead, the Court emphasized that the property
inquiry, although still valid and important, was to be conducted quite
separately from the due process inquiry concerning the constitutional
adequacy of the procedures for the termination of this interest., Thus,
the property analysis was limited to the original Roth concept of
whether "good cause" was a prerequisite to termination. Since the
jobs of both employees in Loudermill possessed this feature, the property requirement for the due process clause had been met and no
further substantive analysis was necessary or proper.
The "value" approach to the due process clause advocated by Van
Alstyne, Mashaw, and others would seem to have been vindicated by

76.

470 U.S. 532 (1985).

77. Id. at 540-41.
78.
79.
80.
without
81.

Id. at 535-37.
Id.
Id. Under Ohio law, both were "classified civil servants" who could be discharged
a pretermination hearing.
Id. at 542.
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Louderinill, although perhaps not as completely or clearly as they
might like. The normative principle of fairness, rather than any particular linguistic detail, appears to be in control. Consequently, procedural rights and other traditional substantive constitutional rights
now share the common feature of inalienability. This impression of
harmony, however, is illusory. This article will argue in the following
two sections that the Court has misperceived the key values underlying
the due process clause, and thus has mistakenly buried the analytic
approach of Arnett.
IV.
"CHOICE" AND THE LIMITS OF DUE PROCESS:
THE GOVERNMENT AS MONOPOLIST OR COMPETITOR

My previous efforts to explicate the entitlement case law and the
due process clause have involved several of the basic themes described
earlier, although from a different point of view and with different
results. My conclusions have been most similar to those of Smolla and
Williams, for they too note the variety of factual contexts in which
entitlement issues arise and hence consider the market background
on which exchange entitlements in particular are based. The economic
conclusions I reach, however, are distinct from theirs in some important respects.62 Moreover, I share with Smolla and many others the
sense that the due process clause embodies some deep, normative
constitutional values against which entitlement controversies must be
understood. But again, the fundamental principle on which this article
focuses is somewhat different from those discussed earlier. 3 I also
agree with Williams, and to some extent Van Alstyne, that the actual
language and structure of the due process clause must be taken into

82. Smolla, for example, pays specific heed to the "contractual element" in the entitlement
area, see Smolla, supra note 1, at 111, and even at one point discusses the relevance of "an
effective government monopoly" over some benefits. See id. at 116. However, his analysis
includes a range of "rational bases for diminished procedural protection," id. at 117, and as a
whole ultimately lacks a unifying normative analytic theme. Williams also develops a kind of
monopoly theory with two prongs - a "preclusion" concept and a "pay-twice" concept - both
of which relate constitutional protection to the kind and degree of impact government actions
have on our range of options (our property and liberty). See Williams, supra note 1, at 21-27.
His development of the preclusion idea is very similar to my approach, while I have found in
my analysis of the entitlement cases no need to add any concept similar to his pay-twice idea.
83. The difference, it seems to me, is largely a matter of emphasis and priority. My "balance"
theory of constitutional protection and the "monopolist" theory of entitlements covered by the
due process clause are not fundamentally inconsistent with or in disagreement with the other
values identified by these authors, such as "dignitary process values," "curbing majoritarian
excesses," and so on.
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account in the implementation of this value. But, my linguistic technique is quite distinct from theirs and my conclusions very different
from those of Laycock. 4
A central theme of my earlier articles, then, and one to which I
continue to adhere, is that linguistic analysis and normative analysis

will always travel together simply because of the structure of language
itself. Although I have since expanded and modified this point elsewhere,5 I argued initially that the meaning of basic legal concepts
like property, liberty, and due process is generated by the interaction
of two fundamental exercises. One, which I termed "definition," 86 is
based on assessment of relatively objective and traditional data sources
such as cases and statutes. The other, which I called "theory,"", involves a subjective normative assessment of that data and other relevant material. Although the terms property and due process certainly
continue to be of vital importance in the entitlement area, the details

of my definitional technique are not sufficiently critical for present
purposes to be repeated here. Instead, because the immediate issue
is whether procedural limitations attached by government to entitlements can ever be legitimate, this article will focus on the normative
or theoretical issues involved in due process analysis, and on the
impact in a more general sense that these principles will have on the
content of the words that comprise the due process clause.
While I accept the general proposition that the due process clause
appears in the Constitution because procedural fairness or nonarbitrar-

84. None of these scholars employs a linguistic technique similar to my division of description
and justification, or my use of a "focal meaning" analysis. See, e.g., Property, Due Process,
supra note 2, at 865-78.
Laycock, interestingly, expresses an idea similar to my analytic technique when he notes at
one point that "[clear cases shape our understanding of concepts and thus guide the analysis
of hard cases." Laycock, supranote 1, at 882. We differ very much, however, on what constitutes
clarity. He, for example, finds an obvious and unarguable separation between substance and
procedure in the syntax of the due process clause. See id. at 879. He, like Professor Ely (see
J. ELY, supra note 1, at 18-19), assumes that any other interpretation reduces that clause to
a tautology. I, on the other hand, find an inevitable overlap of the two major parts of the
clause, and attempt to solve the dilemma of its interpretation at a deeper theoretical level. See
Property, Due Process, supra note 2, at 898-911.
85. See Conceptual Analysis, supra note 50. I now argue that the substance of legal and
moral concepts is better understood as a function of three exercises: "micro-factual" definition,
"macro-factual" explanation, and normative justification. Id. at 675-79.
86. Causes of Action, supra note 2, at 493; Conceptual Analysis, supra note 50, at 663-64
n.20; Liberty, supra note 2, at 550-52; Property, Due Process, supra note 2, at 865-74.
87. Conceptual Analysis, supra note 50, at 676-79; Property, Due Process, supra note 2,
at 874-78.
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iness is an independent normative value itself - that even a good
law may become harsh and unacceptable if administered or implemented poorly - I find it difficult to root this conclusion in the
abstract concept of human dignity. Instead, the key to the due process
clause is a subset of dignity that is fundamental to the Constitution
as a whole: the notion of balance between the individual and governmentes The subject matter of the Constitution is not the human condition in general, but the structure of governmental institutions and
the relationship between those institutions and individual citizens. The
Constitution in a very general sense seeks to establish a balance between government and the individual, or between certain official social
groupings and individuals, a balance required by the enormous power
of these collective entities. Thus, while some parts of the Bill of Rights
insulate certain substantive rights from governmental interference,
the due process clause provides procedural protection, a demand that
otherwise good laws also be administered properly1 9 An adequate
offsetting of governmental power that would achieve a meaningful
balance requires both types of limitations.
Furthermore, as Reich suggested, the increasing scale and pervasiveness of governmental impacts on our lives demands, under this
constitutional theory, that "big law" keep pace in order to maintain
the requisite balance. Thus, the procedures to which we are due under
the due process clause will vary with the factual context of each
situation, but more specifically with the degree of danger presented
in any given situation for potential abuse of governmental power made
possible by an imbalance between government and particular individuals.w
Because modern government is so obviously powerful, and because
the usual context for contact between government and individuals
involves some form of coercion (police, income taxes, and so on), the
natural assumption is that due process protection must always be
relevant and essential. Hence, any suggestion that in the context of
government entitlements such protection could be waived in advance
by an individual would seem to have no legitimate basis. Such is
apparently the conclusion of both the Loudermill decision in its rejection of the Arnett plurality, and of the vast majority of commentators.

88.
89.
of law.
90.

Property, Due Process, supra note 2, at 901-03.
This concept is at the heart of much of Lon Fuller's discussion of the "inner" morality
See L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-94 (1964).
See Liberty, supra note 2, at 587-93.
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But this "government bigness" foundation for due process is a
simplistic and overinclusive application of the more fundamental balance theory. It assumes that balance can only be restored through
the equally big institution of constitutional law. Thus, we return to
the issue with which this article began. Is there no other alternative
source of protection available to the individual when the individual
encounters government? I believe there is, but it is one that forces
the normative concepts of individual liberty and responsibility back
into constitutional jurisprudence.
In my previous articles I argued that a sense of balance between
government and the individual, which animates the Constitution, is
not exclusively provided by constitutional law. The competitive forces
of the marketplace can also establish a protective buffer between the
individual and government in certain circumstances. 91 When government is merely one actor among several in an active, competitive
market, the individual has meaningful options among which to choose.
The individual, concerning the item involved, may decide to deal either
with government or with some private alternative. Or the necessary
competition may alternatively be among various governmental entities,
2
again creating some measure of choice for the individual.9
The element of choice - this opportunity for the exercise of one's
liberty - is also an important factor in the distinction between exchange entitlements and government handouts. Government handouts
are presumed to involve circumstances of great need in which the
individual does not have an effective opportunity to avoid the government, 93 thus creating a noncompetitive imbalance. In these transactions
with government, due process necessarily and unavoidably attaches
because of our constitutional effort to impose limitations that would
not otherwise normally develop. In essence, the government, as a
regulated "monopolist," is prevented from extracting certain monopoly
rents.
But this presumption of imbalance is misplaced in situations in
which the individual and government are engaged in a quid pro quo;
that is, where things of value are being exchanged. The typical situation is that of employment, where the government pays wages in
exchange for an individual's time and effort. Here the imbalance of

91. Property, Due Process, supranote 2, at 901-03. See also id. at 901 n.21 (other effective
constraints on governmental action include physical impossibility and morality); infra text accompanying note 94.
92. See Property, Due Process, supra note 2, at 908.
93. See id. at 904.
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government monopoly is an issue of fact: Does the individual have no
effective choice but to deal with government? If the government is a
monopolist in any given exchange context, then again the constitutional
demand for balance requires an automatic and unavoidable application
of due process protection. But if government is not a monopolist for example, if it is only one among several employers available to
the individual - then balance is already present. Due process need
not necessarily be imposed as a constitutional matter to "protect" the
individual from the individual's own liberty. On the other hand, the
government may find as a factual matter that the competitive forces
of the market compel it to make a full array of procedural protections
available anyway. Thus, while the government would not be legally
obligated in this situation to provide a complete measure of procedural
protection for an entitlement, correspondingly the individual recipient
would not be obligated to accept them. Waiver of procedural protections in this context is therefore legitimate.Y
Thus, for some exchange entitlements, liberty has a meaningful
role to play. Liberty mandates that individuals, as part of their dignity,
take some responsibility for their unforced choices. This approach, I
would argue, is the unspoken normative background for Justice
Rehnquist's famous, or infamous, reference in Arnett to "taking the
bitter with the sweet." 95 Indeed, in four of the five entitlement decisions
discussed earlier, the government entity involved was not an effective
monopolist of the particular type of employment.9 Because individual

94. See id. at 904-09. Although waiver of procedural rights has been recognized as legitimate
in other contexts by the Supreme Court, my approach is a significant extension of the reasoning
in these cases. For example, in Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972), the Court
determined that the waiver by a debtor of notice and hearing in a cognovit note was not
unconstitutional because of the business context of the transaction. Id. at 185-87. The Court

concluded that the record established that the debtor had knowingly and voluntarily waived its
procedural rights with full awareness of the legal consequences. Id. The note was supported

by consideration and the waiver it contained was the product of negotiations between parties
of equal bargaining power. Id. See also Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (contract
signed by CIA agent created special trust relationship waiving certain first amendment rights).
95. Aniett, 416 U.S. at 154.
96. See Lcudermill, 470 U.S. at 532 (involving a bus mechanic and a security guard);
Bislwp, 426 U.S. at 342-43 (based upon a claim by a local police officer); Arnett, 416 U.S. at
134 (concerning a federal civil service employee - a field representative in a regional office of
the Office of Economic Opportunity); Roth, 408 U.S. at 566-69 (involving a non-tenure track
college instructor position). Of these jobs, only the police position might be thought to implicate

a government monopoly, but this conclusion would ignore the competition that exists among
governmental entities for law enforcement officers. See Property, Due Process, supra note 2,

at 908.
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choice was available, constitutional balance was present. Consequently, the individual was free, under my theory, to waive whatever procedural protections the individual and the government agreed
upon as the government sought to remain competitive in the relevant
market.
Therefore, the results reached by the Roth and Bishop majorities
and the Arnett plurality were all correct, while the decision in Loudermill was wrong. Furthermore, the application of due process principles
in Logan was correct, but not directly because of a theory of rational
relationship. Instead, the enforcement of the rights of the handicapped
is quite simply a good example of a government monopoly.
This theoretical approach to the due process clause is also consistent
with the linguistic approach taken by the Court in these cases. The
mistake made by the Loudermill majority - a mistake specifically
avoided by the Arnett plurality - was the conclusion that the property
inquiry mandated by Roth is a one-step process. Although Roth did
establish that a job was entitled to the property label when it could
only be terminated for cause, that decision did not fully investigate
the nature of that property interest. This second issue requires a
second analytical step.
97
Property is a complex rather than a simple, all-or-nothing, concept.
While a particular ownership interest might be less than absolute, the
interest can nevertheless be considered property.98 The analogy I used
in my previous articles to help explain this linguistic phenomenon was
that of the distinction between Swiss and cheddar cheese: despite the
holes, the Swiss is still classified as cheese. 99 Consequently, a thorough
analysis of the due process clause requires not only a general theory
of this constitutional right, but a sensitivity to the substantive detail
embodied in the language and structure of the clause.
This quick summary of my earlier work omits, however, a number
of important and controversial points. On the normative side, for example, the "balance" and "government-as-monopolist" ideas are not
synonymous. Rather, the balance idea is a general constitutional theory
that also underlies due process protection, while the government-asmonopolist idea is a more specific theory concerning the alienability
of such rights. 10 0 Moreover, the monopolist theory, rooted in choice,

97. Property, Due Process, supra note 2, at 868-74.
98. Id. at 868-69, 890-91.
99. Id. at 890-91.
100. See Property,Due Process, supra note 2, at 901-11.
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is as much descriptive as it is prescriptive. Application of the theory
depends on a factual inquiry into the options available to an individual.
Consequently, procedural protection is not only an alienable rather
than inalienable right, but the proper circumstances of waiver could
be factually complex. Some of these circumstances were examined in
prior articles where I concluded that the wide range of results in the
entitlement cases at that time was better described and understood
under my complex approach than under any simpler rules that might
be available.01
A repetition of those points in my analysis is not necessary here,
however. Instead, I find that to defend my thesis concerning exchange
entitlements, I must address two very general and basic issues that
I and other commentators with similar market-oriented perspectives
have previously failed to discuss. First, I argued in prior work that
the Roth line of cases was unique because it did not involve a substantive limitation, such as a restriction on one's freedom of speech, being
imposed on an entitlement, but only a procedural limitation, such as
a waiver of a pretermination hearing. But if individual choice is available in a given situation involving an exchange entitlement, why should
the individual be able to waive procedural rights but not substantive
rights? My monopolist theory is not based on any distinction between
substantive and procedural rights, thus suggesting that no foundation
exists for making substantive rights inalienable while procedural rights
are alienable. Yet if my theory makes substantive rights alienable, it
would seem to be clearly contrary to the traditional academic and
judicial point of view on entitlements.
A second issue is closely related to the first. Just as my theory
does not seem to make any distinction between substantive and procedural rights, it also seems to make no distinction among any particular procedural rights. Thus, government would apparently not be
under any limitations concerning the type and quantity of procedural
rights that it could demand the individual waive in a non-monopoly
situation. The results in the Roth line of cases do not seem overly
outrageous, even if one disagrees with their results, simply because
the procedures waived - pretermination hearings - were quite limited. The individual could still seek, after all, post-termination relief
in courts of general jurisdiction. A waiver of all one's procedural
protections would obviously not have been countenanced even in the

101. See id. at 901-35; see also Liberty, supranote 2, at 578-86 (discussion of the relationship
between liberty and property and liberty and due process).
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Arnett heyday of attention to definitional detail and respect for market
outcomes. But under my theory, if government is merely one actor
in a competitive market, and if that market situation would permit
government to demand a waiver of all one's procedural rights without
suffering a significant competitive disadvantage, then government
would seem to be entitled to enforce this remarkable and counterintuitive result.
Clearly, in order to handle these issues my theory needs expansion
and clarification. That is the task of section V.
V.

A

THE LIMITS OF "CHOICE":
THEORY OF INALIENABLE RIGHTS

Respect for individual responsibility, rather than just individual
rights, has generated the two uncomfortable implications of my
monopolist theory described in Section IV. Therefore, to overcome
these difficulties I must either abandon this rather conservative normative perspective in favor of some neo-Reichian assumption of deterministic futility, 102 or improve my understanding of the nature and
limits of responsibility in the context of exchange entitlements. I
choose to defend the latter course, although I do not pretend that
this brief discussion is anything other than a preliminary investigation
of some very complex and abstract issues.
At the most general level, the problem raised by the entitlement
cases, and Reich's article, is the sale of rights. Rights, or claims to
non-interference or other forms of proper behavior, are of course the
essence of the market. Not only do rights define the nature of markets,
but rights are always the fundamental subject matter of any contractual transaction. As every first-year law student can recite, when
property of any form changes hands, the exchange involves not simply
some identifiable res, but the rights to use, destroy, sell, and so on,
that res.103 In the entitlement cases, however, individuals are viewed
as exchanging rights themselves, whether substantive or procedural,
for economic gain. Ironically, the market seems then to be consuming
itself. This may help explain the almost universal criticism of the
Court's pre-Loudermill property myopia. Even if one takes a market-

102. I borrow this phrase from among several invented by Professor Robert Summers in
a summary discussion of 'ideological sources of irrationalism." See Summers, Legal Philosophy
Today - An Introduction, in ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 1, 7 (R.Summers ed. 1968).
103. See Property, Due Process, supra note 2, at 869.
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based approach to exchange entitlements, surely there must be certain
limits to our freedom to sell our freedoms. 1°4

104. There are several ways to approach this topic of legitimate limits to our market
freedoms. In the context of exchange entitlements, an alternative or supplement to the perspective taken in the text is to examine the struggle between "demand side" and "supply side"
economic reasoning.
In essence, this issue, which no longer captures nearly the academic attention it once did,
involves which comes first - demand for an item or supply of the item. In other words, the
question is which is the dominant basic variable in the economic arena. Demand-siders focus on
the consumer, attempting to generate economic well-being by providing all persons a level of
income and protection sufficient to make them viable actors in the economic drama. Their
demand then creates supplies of what they want. In an important and fundamental way, supplysiders have the opposite perspective. As George Gilder once put it: "Supply creates its own
demand . . . . Producers play a leading and initiatory role in eliciting, shaping, and creating
demand. Investment decisions will be crucial in determining both the quantity and the essential
pattern of consumer purchases." G. GILDER, WEALTH AND POvERTY 36 (1981). Thus, the
focus shifts to the entrepreneur. As a result, economic policy shifts to efforts to induce the
entrepreneur to take risks and produce what we want.
The details of this debate are not as important here as are the distinctive attitudes these
two economic philosophies bring to the struggle in "law and economics" literature between two
similarly disparate approaches to the resolution of legal issues. Although Judge Posner is famous
for his contention that law should (and often does) '"mimic the market," see R. POSNER,
ECONOMlIC ANALYSIS OF LAw (2d ed. 1977), the law could do so in two very different ways.
One method is to emphasize the creation of market conditions - such as individual autonomy,
liberty, information availability, low transaction costs - so that those involved can resolve
disputes. The other approach is for a third party to impose hypothetical market results outcomes thought to represent those that reasonable economic actors would (or should) eventually
have bargained to. See Coleman, Economics and the Law: A Critical View of the Foundations
of the Economic Approach to Law, 94 ETHICS 649, 658-59 (1984). Assuming relatively low
transaction costs, a focus on market conditions is consistent with a supply-side mentality because
it does not presuppose the nature of the item being exchanged. A focus on market results, on
the other hand, is demand-side in that it presupposes the substance of future bargains, under
the assumption of the nature of the "reasonable" parties to such transactions.
The debate concerning government entitlements illustrates the difference between these two
approaches. As an initial matter, transaction costs concerning each additional contract term are
very low, and thus fall within the description above. Law here could, then, "mimic the market"
by either creating market conditions for the proper negotiation between government and the
individual, or it could bypass this step and simply impose the "proper" (most probable?) result
between the parties. Both techniques have been evidenced in the cases, some emphasizing the
role of government as supplier of the entitlement, others emphasizing the individual as consumer
of the entitlement.
The supply-side approach does not tend to see a rigid distinction between "life, liberty, or
property" on the one hand and "due process" on the other. Both are ultimately composed of
"rights," and all rights are alienable and the proper subject of market transactions. With no
pre-existing legal constraints on this aspect of the market, government is therefore encouraged
to act as an entrepreneur. In contrast, the demand-side approach accentuates and depends upon
the distinction between substance and its procedural protection, with the latter considered as
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Such a limit does exist, but it is not well understood. Indeed, in
the area of entitlements, confusion about this limit is the basis for the
two previously noted possible criticisms of the monopoly theory. The
basic problem is that the idea of selling one's freedoms seems to be
a proverbial slippery slope. If one can waive one type of procedural
right, why not substantive rights and other types of procedural rights
as well? This slope, however, is terraced, on both counts, under a
single principle.
Yet this terrace or conceptual breakpoint in the subject of selling
one's rights is not the traditional supposed distinction between substance and procedure. Those that find this separation problematic are
correct, but particularly so in the area of exchange entitlements involving employment. Here either type of right can be, and regularly is,
waived as consideration for one's wages and position. While a wholesale
waiver of basic freedoms as an expected part of an employment agreement is fortunately part of our past, we still do fully and reasonably
expect some waiver of individual rights to accompany the taking of
any job. The idea is so basic it seems to have been forgotten. While
an employee has a right of free speech, for example, that right does
not include talking while on the job in ways or amounts detrimental
to the actual business of the employer. This principle applies not only
to the obvious, yet extreme, case of the CIA agent who as an aspect
of his employment cannot discuss his work, politics, or many other
subjects,105 but also to the more mundane, yet subtle, cases of school
bus mechanics or security guards who neglect their work. Indeed,
this expectation is so endemic that we no longer understand basic
rights to include these aspects, until an unusual case arises to remind
us of the waiver that has in fact occurred even in the ordinary employment situation.
Thus, while the Supreme Court is correct in insisting that substantive and procedural rights must be treated with equal respect and
gravity, the Court is wrong in then holding that procedural rights,
like substantive rights, cannot become a part of a market transaction.
Instead, in order to establish the necessary equivalence in treatment,
procedural rights should be understood as waivable, just like substantive rights. Neither. procedural nor substantive rights are absolute; in

something that a reasonable consumer would not ordinarily trade away. Thus, a particular kind
or style of government entitlement is presupposed or preordained, not, however, through the
distinction between substance and procedure, but through the designation of some rights as
inalienable. And that is precisely the point reached in the text, although from a different direction.
105. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
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the proper circumstances, both are the appropriate subject of negotiation and compromise. Therefore, identifying these proper circumstances is critical to understanding the terraces in the slope of
the alienability of rights. Unfortunately, this conclusion hardly
simplifies the matter. A coherent picture of the principles that help
determine the proper situations of alienability requires, ironically
enough, a series of steps.
At the most general level, we again face the basic issue of the sale
of rights. Some types of rights seem to be quite clearly and noncontroversially alienable - particularly, for example, those rights associated
with some res and hence denominated "property" rights. Other rights,
however, have traditionally been understood as inalienable, such as
freedom of speech or freedom of religion. Indeed, alienability has often
been considered one of the essential factors distinguishing the major
conceptual categories of property and liberty. I have investigated these
categories and the issue of alienability elsewhere, focusing primarily
on a private or non-government context.0 6 The basic conclusion of
that effort is nevertheless applicable here. The difference between
those situations in which rights can be sold and those in which they
cannot is best understood from the broad economic perspective of
"error cost analysis.'107
A form of this perspective has long been suggested as one justification for the very presence of the due process clause in the Constitution. Some argue that procedural protections are meant primarily to
guarantee a relatively accurate government decisionmaking process
- in short, to reduce the numbers, unpredictability, and cost of government errors. This perspective is reflected in Professor Van
Alstyne's work,',, and was recently discussed and criticized by Professor Mashaw. 1°9 However, the present reference to error cost analysis
is more general. The focus here is not on due process directly, but
more fundamentally on the transactions that can implicate this -constitutional protection. The issue then is not theories of due process,
but theories of alienability. 1 0 In the context of government entitle-

106. See Terrell & Smith, Publicity, Liberty, and Intellectual Property:A Conceptual and
EcoinmicAnalysis of the InheritabilityIssue, 34 EMORY L.J. 1 (1985) [hereinafter Publicity].
107. For two standard citations for this proposition, see 0. MORGENSTERN, THE LIMITS
OF ECONOMICS (1937); 0. MORGENSTERN, ON THE ACCURACY OF ECONOMIC OBSERVATIONS

(2d ed. 1963).
108. See Van Alstyne, supra note 1, at 485-90.
109. See DUE PROCESS, supra note 1, at 102-57.
110.

See Publicity, supra note 106, at 49-53.
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ments, these issues happen to intersect, but the more specific question
for exchange entitlements is whether the limits on our freedom to sell
our freedoms might be based on some related sense of the avoidance
of error.
Without referring to error cost analysis as such, this is precisely
the question confronted by Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed in
their seminal article on 'Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability.'111 Their focus was also on situations of exchange, but the main
point in their analysis, for our purposes, was their development of an
economic explanation for a quite common but economically anomalous
phenomenon: the prohibition of some voluntary transactions, or inalienability.12 Their conclusion, in partial summary, was that in some
circumstances inalienability was a function of the fact that the parties
to a transaction would be unable to measure the impact of the transaction on either themselves, third parties, or both.113 This situation
would arise, most basically, where the transaction involved fundamental rights and where the value of these rights to the transacting parties
and others would be incommensurable."4 Because such a transaction
raises the prospect of significant, unpredictable, and unmeasurable
error by the parties, Calabresi and Melamed concluded that such voluntary transactions could justifiably be prohibited in advance. In short,
rules of inalienability could be economically as well as morally legitimate.
Similarly, rules of alienability could be economically and morally
legitimate. If incommensurable values are not at stake, then rights
themselves certainly can be the legitimate subject matter of contractual negotiation and compromise. Critical to this error cost analysis,
therefore, is the identification of those situations that generate the

111. Calabresi & Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:One View
of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
112. See id. at 1111-15. After a surprisingly long period of inattention, the phenomenon of
inalienability, raised so provocatively by Calabresi and Melamed, has recently experienced a
flurry of scholarly investigation. In addition to Publicity, supra note 106, at 49-53, see generally
Epstein, Why RestrainAlienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970 (1985); Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987); Rose-Ackerman, Inalienabilityand the Theory of Property
Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1985).
113. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 111, at 1111.
114. The authors identify various '"moralisms" as good examples of nonquantifiable considerations that may lead to prohibition of certain transactions, such as selling oneself into slavery
or selling vital, life-sustaining organs. See id. at 1102-05, 1112. For a discussion of "paternalistic"
assessments of long-range efficiencies to either or both of the transacting parties themselves,
see id. at 1113-14.
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dangers of incommensurability, and then in turn determining whether
the exchange entitlement cases are good examples of this unfortunate
circumstance.
I suggest that incommensurability, and hence legitimate inalienability, is not a function of the traditional idea of the importance of the
right involved in a transaction, 115 but rather primarily of the "specificity" with which that right is delineated.11 6 For example, in the ordinary
employment context, no one seriously questions the notion that basic
rights have indeed been waived simply because the waiver is specifically limited to certain times and situations. No wholesale concession
of freedom has occurred, and therefore the danger of serious and
incommensurable error impacting the parties to the contract or other
persons is very small. Instead, the parties are quite capable of assessing and internalizing all the relevant costs. On the other hand, if the
employer demands a broader waiver of rights than those associated
with the employee's actual working responsibilities, the precise circumstances of incommensurability suggested by Calabresi and
Melamed is raised. A prohibition against such contract terms is therefore justified.
In the exchange entitlement area, then, the question is whether
the rights that individuals have waived are in the alienable or inalienable category. Stating the issue in this form demonstrates most clearly
that my earlier government-as-monopolist theory is in fact a part of
a larger picture, and that its limitations noted above are endemic.
That is, regardless of whether government stands as a monopolist in
any situation, one can conclude that the right being traded raises the
problem of incommensurability and should therefore be insulated from
exchange. The issue of alienability is thus prior to any inquiry into
individual choice. Larger, "macro" normative concerns clearly take
precedence over more specific, "micro" demands for individual responsibility.11 7 In this sense, Reich and his more recent counterparts are
correct.
But they exaggerate the point. The alienability issue and the
monopoly theory do not necessarily pull in opposite directions. Quite
the contrary, I would argue that my earlier assessment of the entitlement cases stands even more firmly under the combination of these

115. Property, Due Process, supra note 2, at 910-11; Williams, supra note 1, at 14-17.
116. Publicity, supra note 106, at 28-32.
117. The distinction between "micro" and "macro" perspectives is discussed further in Conceptual Analysis, supra note 50, at 616-20.
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two perspectives. The supposed distinction between substantive and
procedural rights on the basis of alienability is indeed illusory, for
both are legitimately waivable to a limited, transaction-specific extent.
Thus, as a general proposition the approach taken explicitly by the
Arnett plurality was quite justified: permitting procedural rights to
be the subject of negotiation does nothing more than bring them into
line with the actual treatment given substantive rights. The real issue
is whether the procedural rights involved in these cases somehow
endangered incommensurable values and therefore should be removed
from the market.
I believe that they did not, and that the Loudermill rejection of
Arnett, both as a general matter and as applied specifically to its
facts, was erroneous. The procedural rights involved in all the employment cases were limited and specific - rights to pretermination hearings and nothing more. The employee did not waive a more general
and basic right to sue his employer, after termination, for wrongful
discharge. In contrast, the substantive rights being waived in the
early entitlement cases were not so limited. In those cases employees
were being terminated for exercising the right to free speech and the
right against self-incrimination, unconnected with their work." 8
The right missing in Logan, however, is a different matter altogether. It may well have been limited and specific, so that its loss
might occasion no great peril,"1 but that case did not involve any
exchange that might have been the legitimate basis for its elimination.
Instead, Logan is a case of government monopoly in which the lack
of individual choice precludes, on separate but related grounds, government's efforts to make its administrative tasks easier. The incommensurable value involved here is the danger inherent in the government's
ability to extract monopoly rents in situations of imbalance. 12o

118. See Property, Due Process, supra note 2, at 880 nn.74 & 75.
119. The case involved only a state agency's effort to make its own job easier by eliminating
"stale" claims. While this idea is not itself offensive, the problem was that the state agency
could itself make the claims stale by failing to act on them in a timely fashion, and the claimant
would have no basis for objecting to this failure. See Causes of Action, supra note 2, at 503.
Nevertheless, the range of individuals or behavior impacted by this bureaucratic technique
would not be particularly large, except if it were adopted generally. See infra note 122 and
accompanying text.
120. This point becomes most obvious if one realizes that the time limits for agency action
in Logan had little or nothing to do with the "reasonableness" of the agency's procedures for
due process purposes. In other words, the agency's 120 day limit for its own responses could
have been lengthened to five years and the procedures would still have been defective because
the agency itself had total, monopolistic control over whether it would meet that jurisdictional
I
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An important difficulty with this approach remains, however, that
forces an interesting link to be forged between Arnett and Logan. To
this point, my references to contracts and contract negotiations have
been rather abstract and idealistic. I have assumed that in those
situations in which government is not a monopolist, individual choice
does have some role to play, and that the resulting contractual waiver
of rights will be automatically legitimate. Yet even Justice Rehnquist
in his opinion in Arnett did not go so far. In a brief and ambiguous
21
aside, which I dismissed in my earlier analysis of his reasoning,1
Justice Rehnquist described the employment position in that case to
be "inextricably intertwined with the limitations on the procedures ' l12
for terminating it. In other words, the substance and procedure of
the job were in some way unusually interrelated and dependent on
one another. In that context, Justice Rehnquist had no difficulty determining that the employee took the job with eyes open, "the bitter
with the sweet."
Implicit in this reasoning, as I did not recognize before, is a wariness concerning the contractual process that my discussion of alienability now requires be made more explicit. The basic idea is that any
normal contract, and certainly any employment contract, is a complex
rather than a simple event. The contract involves agreement on a
range of topics rather than just one or two, and it is accepted as a
package rather than piecemeal.m As a consequence, one can have no
great confidence that any particular term in a contract has been specifically considered by the individual who is presumed to have exercised
freedom of choice in contracting. For example, in an employment
contract the employee agrees to a number of separate matters: type
of work, level of wages, future prospects, and so on. One of them
may be the waiver of some specific substantive or procedural right,
which is our present concern.
The problem then is that while the waiver of a specific and limited
right may not ordinarily raise the specter of serious error cost, it may
nevertheless not have been seriously considered at the time the contract was consummated. Thus, the costs associated with this waiver,
which are already difficult to assess, may not have been considered
at all in advance, or may not have been given their proper weight in

requirement. See Causes of Action, supra note 2, at 531-32. As long as the government holds
all the cards, the demands of due process will be severe.
121. Property, Due Process, supra note 2, at 889 n.152.
122. Arnett, 416 U.S. at 153-54.
123. This observation was made by Williams, supra note 1, at 29.
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the employee's calculation, thereby compounding the chances for error.
With these assumptions in mind, references to individual responsibility
begin to sound rather sanctimonious.
This explains, I would argue, Justice Rehnquist's insistence on
some intimate connection between the item of government largesse
and its procedural limitaion. In a sense, the waiver is being subjected
to a "big print" test:1s was the matter brought specifically to the
attention of the party who is now disadvantaged, or was the term so
important to the essence of the contract that this party can reasonably
be charged with the responsibility for realizing the nature of the
term?1' Such a caveat to the contractual approach I have taken to
exchange entitlements seems to me entirely reasonable.
Moreover, the additional caveat suggested by the rational relationship requirement from Logan seems entirely reasonable. Although
Logan involved a government monopoly situation, the government in
these circumstances is not forced to make all rights available all the
time. Government can create and transfer a limited sort of interest,
but the way in which we know that the government is not thereby
extracting a monopoly rent is to insist that the limitation bear a rational
relationship to legitimate government interests. By the same token,
in non-monopoly situations, in light of the more constrained attitude
I now take toward contractual waiver, the rational relationship requirement can also serve as a standard for assessing whether an individual in fact exercised freedom of choice in waiving a right. If the
right waived would in a monopoly situation have failed to meet this
test, then one could reasonably presume that in the non-monopoly
situation the full range of implications of the contract term was not
sufficiently understood or appreciated by the individual. But in this
market context, this would only be a rebuttable presumption.126

124. In several areas of the law, requirements for obvious and specific notice of important
contract terms have been imposed. For example, the Uniform Commercial Code contains a
definition of "conspicuous" (U.C.C. § 1-201(10) (1977)) that in turn supplies substance to other
provisions, such as U.C.C. § 8-204 (1977) requiring that restrictions on the transferability of
stock certificates be "noted conspicuously thereon." See Ling & Co. v. Trinity Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 482 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1972). The Federal Trade Commission has likewise promulgated
specific regulations concerning the "big print" necessary to give consumers adequate notice of
certain contract provisions. FTC Holder-in-Due-Course Regulations, 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1987),
prohibit sellers from entering into consumer credit transactions unless the contract contains

"the following [notice] provision in at least ten point, bold face, type .

...

"

125. This approach is similar to, although an extension of, the majority's reasoning in
Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972). See supra note 94.
126. Although this demand for a "rational relationship" between the right waived and a
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VI.

CONCLUSION

The final picture that emerges from the set of principles that should
guide the constitutional assessment of exchange entitlements is a complex one. The element I have stressed that few seem to take seriously
in this context is the sense of liberty upon which so much of the
Constitution is founded. If that element is to have any meaning in
the land of new property, then individuals must be assumed to accept
some measure of personal accountability for their own voluntary
choices. Regarding the receipt of government largesse, the issue is
not one's responsibility for the welfare of others, but one's responsibility for oneself.1-

legitimate government interest raises a new conceptual question that is largely beyond the scope
of this article, one aspect of this issue does deserve at least some mention here. In a previous
article, I explored briefly whether the concepts of property and due process were in some way
related, such that an "increase" in the former would cause a corresponding "increase" in the
latter. Property, Due Process, supra note 2, at 938. This idea of "increase" is an abstract one
based on the linguistic detail of these two basic concepts, and that detail I have not reiterated
in this article. But assuming for the moment that some relationship of this sort between property
and due process could be demonstrated, then some parameters to "rational relationship" might
be identified. That is, for more "central" instances of property (in my jargon), more process is
constitutionally "due." Hence, waiver of procedural rights in this context would appear less
reasonable, and the government's burden of demonstrating a "rational relationship" between its
interests and the right waived would be correspondingly higher. By the same token, more
"peripheral" cases of property would demand less procedural protection, and hence less "relationship" between government interest and the rights waived.
127. Some readers may believe that I have depicted the exchange entitlement as if the
transaction involved only one "responsible" entity. That is, the contract seems to be between
an individual on the one side and an amoral machine - "the government" - on the other. But
what of the goveirnmznt's responsibility in this context? On what basis is the government entitled
to search for the market clearing level of waiver of (otherwise) constitutional rights? Surely the
individuals who in fact comprise the government have the obligation to uphold rather than
curtail rights.
This is a serious perspective, one advanced by those who ascribe an important "moral leadership" function to government. The argument is often bolstered by the observation that the
government, even when acting in what would otherwise appear to be a "market," is operating
with the money and under authority granted to it by all of us. It therefore cannot pretend to
be just another competitive entity. It has a responsibility to be "better."
This is of course a complex normative proposition that I will not tackle directly here. The
difficulty is that "better" in this situation necessarily means "inefficient" and "more expensive,"
and these disadvantages are not necessarily counterbalanced by the creation of "more rights"
or more "respect" for rights. As Steve Williams has noted, procedural protections that work to
the advantage of incumbent employees correspondingly work to the disadvantage of those who
desire to replace them in these employment situations. Williams, supra note 1, at 27-31.
I therefore find no obvious asymmetry in my thesis. The sense of responsibility upon which
I have focused is that of accountability for one's uncoerced choices. That kind of responsibility
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I have not, however, taken a purist or libertarian position regarding
responsibility and individual freedom. I argued in previous articles,
and reiterate here, the government-as-monopolist theory that recognizes that in many important situations individuals do not have a
meaningful opportunity for choice when dealing with government. In
those circumstances, "big law" must indeed enter the picture to restore
the sense of balance that underlies the concept of liberty. One's due
process rights, as well as others, are insulated from the government's
efforts to collect monopoly rents. But where choice is available, liberty
and responsibility must assume their proper constitutional roles.
In this article I have, however, added more complexity to the
situation. The more fundamental background principle at work in the
entitlement area is that of inalienability based on the dangers inherent
in market transactions involving incommensurable values. Thus, even
in non-monopoly situations, individuals may legitimately be insulated
from their own folly; but not in all situations. The issue becomes
whether the rights waived are sufficiently limited, specific, and rationally related to the government's objectives to be items upon which a
meaningful bargain could have been struck.
Little has been said here, however, about the practicality of such
an approach. The determination of when a government monopoly exists
or when an incommensurable value is at stake is a matter of fact that
is both circumstantial and subjective. These sorts of large-scale "valuefacts" have traditionally been treated as matters of law, and here
constitutional law, for courts to decide. But courts dislike such complexity, just as the rest of us dislike uncertainty in the application of
such basic principles. 12 Thus, the simplistic, meat-ax approach to exchange entitlements evidenced in Loudermill may in fact be unavoidable. Government jobs will be property for purposes of due process
analysis so long as certain bright line elements are present. One can
only hope that analytical sophistication will ultimately be permitted
to reenter the entitlement field.

I impose with equal vigor on both parties: government gets the "bitter with the sweet" just as
the individual does. Any additional "moral leadership" imposed on government must be based
on a theory that must respond to its own anomaly: government is directed to protect and perfect

a market in which its own participation causes distortion due to a requirement that it not act
like anyone else.
128. This is one of Professor Simon's criticisms of the economic analysis of entitlements
suggested by Stephen Williams. See Simon, Economic Analysis of Liberty and Property: A
Critique, 57 U. COLO. L. REv. 747, 751-54 (1986).
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